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THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:  
A PERSONAL REMEMBRANCE 
John D. Feerick* 
 
And so, my fellow Americans:  ask not what your country can do for 
you—ask what you can do for your country. 
—John F. Kennedy, January 20, 1961 
 
When I left law school, I did not realize that I would have a unique 
opportunity to apply the learning I received on the Constitution.  It all started 
with a newspaper item I saw describing a constitutional problem involving 
the disability of a President.  I mentioned the subject to my college classmate, 
Louis Viola, who said he had a file of newspaper clippings that dealt with the 
disabilities of President Eisenhower.  Upon reading it, I became fascinated 
by the subject and decided to research the issue and offer my ideas as to a 
solution. 
By early 1963, I had written a rather long article entitled “The Problem of 
Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?” and submitted it to the 
Fordham Law Review for consideration.1  In its opening section, it stated that 
the presence in the White House of a “young, able and healthy President” 
made it timely to consider the subject, since there could be no reflection on 
the current occupant of the office.2  I offered my solution, influenced by 
Eisenhower’s 1958 letter agreement with Vice President Nixon.3  The article 
appeared in the October 1963 issue of the Law Review.  I followed up its 
publication with a letter to the New York Times, published on November 17, 
1963, stating,  
Presidents are mortal. 
 
*  Norris Professor of Law, Founder and Senior Counsel of the Feerick Center for Social 
Justice, Fordham University School of Law.  He served as Dean of the law school from 1982 
to 2002.  This Article is an excerpt from Dean Feerick’s forthcoming memoir.  He wrote this 
chapter in response to inquiries over the years as to how he became involved in the cause of 
reforming the succession system and what his work consisted of.  This Article is published as 
part of the symposium entitled Continuity in the Presidency:  Gaps and Solutions held at 
Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see Matthew Diller, 
Foreword:  Continuity in the Presidency:  Gaps and Solutions, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 911 
(2017). 
 
 1. See John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve 
It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 73 (1963). 
 2. Id. at 76. 
 3. Id. at 112–13, 126–28. 
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President Garfield’s shooting, President Wilson’s stroke, and President 
Eisenhower’s heart attack rendered each temporarily unable to exercise the 
powers and duties of his office.  Despite this, Congress has consistently 
failed the American people by not acting to eliminate the possibility of a 
gap in the executive because of the confusion existing over the meaning of 
the succession provision of the Constitution.4 
To drum up support for a change in the Constitution, I sent reprints of my 
article to individuals who might have an interest in the subject.  Not until 
recent years did I realize that I had stored away in boxes, dating back more 
than fifty years, the acknowledgements I received.  Some examples follow. 
By letter dated November 13, 1963, President Kennedy’s assistant, Ralph 
A. Dungan, said, “The President has received your letter and asked me to 
thank you for sending him the accompanying copy of your article on the 
subject of ‘Presidential Inability.’”5  By letter dated November 13, 1963, 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy did the same but added, “I appreciate 
your bringing it to my attention as this is a subject which we have been 
studying here in the Department for some time.”6  By letter dated November 
5, 1963, Senator Edward M. Kennedy said, “I look forward to reading your 
discussion of this complex subject.”7  George E. Reedy, Press Secretary to 
Vice President Johnson, said in his letter dated November 6, 1963, “I know 
he would be greatly interested in your study which will be called to his 
attention promptly upon his return.”8  Former Vice President Nixon said in a 
letter dated two days before President Kennedy’s assassination: 
This is a subject in which I am most interested, but due to the heavy 
pressures of my legal practice at this time I would not be able to do justice 
to a letter commenting on the article.  If my schedule should lighten up in 
the period ahead, I will have the article in my reading file and will try to 
drop you a note.9 
Former Vice President Henry A. Wallace had a short but interesting 
response, dated November 12, 1963:  “It was most kind of you to send me 
the article on the situation in case of the President’s Inability to discharge his 
office.  Curiously enough I gave this problem no thought while I was Vice 
President.”10  Arthur Krock of the New York Times, in a letter dated 
November 7, 1963, said, “I wish Congress were as much interested [in the 
 
 4. John D. Feerick, Letter to the Editor, Fixing Presidential Succession, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 1963, at E8.  
 5. Letter from Ralph A. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, to author (Nov. 13, 
1963) (on file with the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 6. Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney Gen., to author (Nov. 13, 1963) (on file with 
the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 7. Letter from Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senator, to author (Nov. 5, 1963) (on file with 
the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 8. Letter from George E. Reedy, Special Assistant to the Vice President, to author (Nov. 
6, 1963) (on file with the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 9. Letter from Richard M. Nixon, Counsel, Mudge, Stern, Baldwin & Todd, to author 
(Nov. 20, 1963) (on file with the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 10. Letter from Henry A. Wallace, Farvue Farm, to author (Nov. 12, 1963) (on file with 
the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
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subject] as you and I.”11  Professor David Fellman of the University of 
Wisconsin, in a thoughtful letter of November 7, 1963, said, “It may well 
take a constitutional amendment to solve the problem, but amendments are 
awfully hard to come by, and I should hope we could work something out by 
legislation alone.”12 
I was touched to find in one of my boxes a letter from Fordham Law’s 
Dean Mulligan, in which he said, “The article shows scholarship and research 
of the highest order.  Too many of our Law Review people forget about 
scholarly contributions to the Review after graduation and therefore I was 
delighted to see your very fine piece.”13  He then added: 
My only quibble with your conclusions is point 5 on Page 128 giving the 
right to the President to declare a cessation of the inability.  Query:  Do you 
mean the Vice President or the former President.  If you mean the latter, it 
would seem to me that problems could be created.14 
Dean Mulligan obviously had read the article, as had Nathan Siegel of the 
Department of Justice, who, in a letter of November 19, 1963, questioned the 
wisdom of an impeachment remedy, as discussed in the article, in a neglect-
of-duty context.15  By letter dated November 14, 1963, then-political science 
Professor James C. Finlay, S.J., of Fordham said, “I shall try to see that your 
article will be sent to [Father McKenna]. . . .  We are always delighted at the 
success of our former students in this Department.”16  By note from Nigeria, 
dated April 4, 1964, my college professor, Father Joseph C. McKenna, S.J., 
commented favorably on my Fordham article, but he thought I “over[wrote] 
‘separation of powers,’ . . . prefer[ring] to say they are divided but not 
separate.”17  He concluded with “the piece turned out to be timelier than you 
knew.  Keep up the good work.”18 
Finally, by letter dated November 11, 1963, Lewis F. Powell Jr., president-
elect of the American Bar Association (ABA), said, “The ABA is indeed 
interested in this question, and I am sure your article will be most helpful if 
we should be called upon again to testify.  Quite obviously you have done an 
enormous amount of research and work in the field.”19 
 
 11. Letter from Arthur Krock, N.Y. Times, to author (Nov. 7, 1963) (on file with the 
Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 12. Letter from David Fellman, Professor, Univ. of Wis., to author (Nov. 7, 1963) (on file 
with author). 
 13. Letter from William Hughes Mulligan, Dean, Fordham Sch. of Law, to author (Oct. 
31, 1963) (on file with the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 14. Id.  In my article, I had said “the [former] President.” Feerick, supra note 1, at 128. 
 15. Letter from Nathan Siegel, Dep’t of Justice, to author (Nov. 19, 1963) (on file with 
author). 
 16. Letter from James C. Finlay, S.J., Chairman, Fordham Univ. Dep’t of Political 
Philosophy & Gov’t, to author (Nov. 14, 1963) (on file with the Fordham University School 
of Law Maloney Library). 
 17. Letter from Joseph C. McKenna, S.J., to author (Apr. 4, 1964) (on file with the 
Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Letter from Lewis F. Powell Jr., Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell & Gibson, to author 
(Nov. 11, 1963) (on file with the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
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DEATH OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY 
The academic nature of my writing changed on November 22, 1963, when 
people everywhere were shocked to learn of the assassination of President 
Kennedy.  The press discussed what might have happened if Kennedy had 
lived but was disabled.20  It took me weeks to process this national tragedy.  
He was my hero.  In the meantime, unexpected attention was given to the 
article.  On November 23, 1963, Arthur Krock discussed my views in his 
national column.21  I also received a call from CBS News asking for copies 
of the article for a program it wanted to develop on presidential succession.  
Letters concerning my article arrived that required responses.22  Lowell R. 
Beck, deputy director of the ABA’s Washington office, later said to me that 
he came across the article and thought it would be a helpful tool for educating 
people about the problem.23  He and other key staff urged the ABA, which 
already had a position, to give renewed leadership to solving these 
problems.24  As a result, the ABA decided to convene a two-day conference 
on presidential inability and vice presidential vacancy on January 20 and 21, 
1964, to which twelve lawyers were invited to participate, plus several 
guests.25  I was one of the twelve because of my article.  I had no sense of 
 
 20. See, e.g., Arthur Krock, Kennedy’s Death Points Up Orderly Progression in U.S. 
Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1963, at 9E. 
 21. Id. 
 22. For example, on January 28, 1964, I responded to Congressman Louis C. Wyman of 
New Hampshire who had shared with me a copy of a letter dated January 21, 1964, that he 
sent to his former professor, Paul Freund.  In that letter, Wyman said that Congress could solve 
the problem by statute: 
The Constitution plainly provides that the Vice President shall take over when 
the President has an inability.  It likewise plainly gives to the Legislative Branch the 
power to implement its general caveats by legislating the details of the method. 
The Constitution likewise explicitly authorizes Congress to provide for 
succession when the President and Vice President shall be out of the picture. 
Letter from Louis C. Wyman, U.S. Representative, to Paul Freund, Professor, Harvard Law 
Sch. (Jan. 21, 1964) (on file with author).  In response to Congressman Wyman, I said:   
I find it difficult to accept that a statute which would divert the determination of 
inability from the person next in line, be he the Vice President or, as now, the 
Speaker, would be constitutional.  As the Constitution now stands, it is the duty of 
the Vice President (or the officer next in line) to act as President in cases of inability 
and therefore, by implication, his duty alone to make the determination.  My reading 
of the debates at the Constitutional Convention . . . leads me to the conclusion that 
Congress has no power to legislate in this area other than to name the successors 
after the Vice President. 
Letter from John D. Feerick to the Louis C. Wyman, U.S. Representative (Jan. 28, 1964) (on 
file with author). 
 23. See LOWELL R. BECK, I FOUND MY NICHE:  A LIFETIME JOURNEY OF LOBBYING AND 
ASSOCIATION LEADERSHIP 91 (2016). 
 24. Id. at 80–105. Lowell Beck’s book, I Found My Niche, gives an excellent account of 
the ABA’s engagement with the field of presidential inability and the creation of its 
conference. See generally id. 
 25. The members included Herbert Brownell, former Attorney General; Walter F. Craig 
Jr., president of the ABA and chair of the meetings; Professor Paul A. Freund of Harvard Law 
School; Jonathan C. Gibson, chair of the ABA Committee on Jurisprudence and the Law; 
Richard H. Hansen, author of The Year We Had No President; James C. Kirby Jr., former 
general counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments; Ross L. Malone, 
general counsel of General Motors and a former U.S. Deputy Attorney General; Dean Charles 
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what was to come and was concerned about the diversion of time from my 
billable work at Skadden, where I was a young associate.  The firm became 
totally supportive of this activity. 
THE ABA CONFERENCE AND CONSENSUS 
Before the meetings in Washington’s famous Mayflower Hotel, each 
participant received a binder of reading material.  I was surprised to see my 
article as the leadoff reading.  If it did nothing else, it gave a detailed history 
of presidential disability from colonial America to 1963;26 it discussed 
precedents in the fifty states27 and foreign countries,28 and the many 
proposals to solve the problem; and it suggested that the major roles should 
be with the President and Vice President,29 with the additional 
recommendation that, in making any determination, the Vice President 
should secure the opinions of “the heads of executive departments.”30  Other 
material in the binder included an article by Lewis F. Powell Jr.; excerpts 
from both President Nixon’s book, Six Crises, and the Congressional Record; 
a copy of Senate Joint Resolution 139 (“S.J. Res. 139”), then not yet in print; 
and a print of the Senate hearings of June 1963, chaired by Senator Estes 
Kefauver, who had died in August 1963. 
From this two-day conference, the following consensus developed as to 
the content of a constitutional amendment: 
(1) [i]n the event of the inability of the President, the powers and duties, 
but not the office, shall devolve upon the Vice-President or person next in 
line of succession for the duration of the inability of the President or until 
expiration of his term of office; 
(2) in the event of the death, resignation or removal of the President, the 
Vice-President or the person next in line of succession shall succeed to the 
office for the unexpired term; 
(3) the inability of the President may be established by declaration in 
writing of the President.  In the event that the President does not make 
known his inability, it may be established by action of the Vice-President 
or person next in line of succession with the concurrence of a majority of 
the Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may by law 
provide; 
(4) the ability of the President to resume the powers and duties of his office 
shall be established by his declaration in writing.  In the event that the Vice-
President and a majority of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may 
by law provide shall not concur in the declaration of the President, the 
 
B. Nutting of the George Washington University Law School; Lewis F. Powell Jr.; Martin 
Taylor, chair of the New York State Bar Association committee on the Constitution; and 
Edward L. Wright, chair of the ABA House of Delegates. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING 
HANDS:  THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 244 (1965). 
 26. Feerick, supra note 1, at 90–102. 
 27. Id. at 102–05. 
 28. Id. at 105–10. 
 29. Id. at 112–13. 
 30. Id. at 114. 
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continuing disability of the President may then be determined by the vote 
of two-thirds of the elected members of each House of the Congress; and 
(5) when a vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice-President the President 
shall nominate a person who, upon approval by a majority of the elected 
members of Congress meeting in joint session, shall then become Vice-
President for the unexpired term.31 
I found the meetings stimulating.  ABA President Craig made clear that no 
one was too young to participate.  At the meetings, I sat near Paul Freund and 
Senator Birch Bayh.  This contributed to a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to 
come to know them.  Freund was America’s preeminent constitutional 
scholar and later would write the foreword to my first book on presidential 
succession,32 and Bayh would write the foreword to my second book on the 
Amendment itself.33  I found fascinating the openness of the discussions, the 
way everyone respectfully challenged each other’s points of view, and the 
spirit that prevailed of reaching a consensus. 
The need for substantial reform had no doubters in the group.  Some 
favored giving Congress a broad power to legislate with respect to this area, 
while others, including myself, were fearful of this approach because of the 
possible political uses of such a power.  Professor Freund, gentle and soft-
spoken with an angelic quality to him, wondered out loud whether a disability 
commission with a mixed composition might be worthy of consideration.  I 
remember commenting, shyly, that such a commission would not be 
compatible with the principle of separation of powers, a subject I had studied 
at Fordham College.  He said, without explanation, “I agree” and thereafter 
did not press this idea. 
Vincent Doyle of the Library of Congress, an invited guest, suggested that 
we combine both approaches in a constitutional amendment—granting 
power to determine inability to a specific body such as the Cabinet and 
granting power to establish another body.  This led to the wording that is 
contained in Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which combines the 
Vice President with the Cabinet or “such other body as Congress may by law 
provide” for the declaration of inability and its termination.34  The “other 
body” expression reflected the approach of Senate Joint Resolution 35 (“S.J. 
Res. 35”), then pending in Congress, sponsored by Senator Kenneth B. 
Keating of New York State, and supported by the ABA, the New York State 
Bar Association, and the New York City Bar Association.35  The Senate 
champion of the first approach was a new and young Senator from Indiana, 
Birch Bayh (then age thirty-five), who had succeeded Kefauver as chair of 
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments.  Bayh’s approach was 
 
 31. FEERICK, supra note 25, at 245 (footnote omitted); see also James C. Kirby Jr., A 
Breakthrough on Presidential Inability:  The ABA Conference Consensus, 17 VAND. L. REV. 
463, 475–78 (1964). 
 32. See generally FEERICK, supra note 25, at ix–xi. 
 33. See Birch Bayh, Foreword to the 1976 Edition of JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-
FIFTH AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS, at xix, xix (3d ed. 2014). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
 35. S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong. (1963). 
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reflected in a draft he had with him of S.J. Res. 139.  As we left the consensus 
meeting, Doyle said to me that he was helped coming to his view from 
reading my Fordham Law Review article. 
Unlike the subject of presidential inability, it was not difficult at the 
conference to reach a consensus on how to fill a vacancy in the vice 
presidency.  The approach of point (5) of the consensus mirrored the practice 
that had developed of presidential candidates selecting their running mates.  
The provision calling for confirmation by both houses of Congress was seen 
as a way of expressing a national consensus in support of the President’s 
nominee for the position.  Almost as an afterthought, someone pointed out 
that the determination of an inability by the Vice President in point (3), with 
the approval of the Cabinet or another body, would not work if there were a 
vacancy in the vice presidency.  A suggestion was made, accepted, and placed 
in point (1) that the person next in line of succession should perform that role.  
I recall noticing on the second day, as we were about to conclude, that the 
draft was not clear on whether a President declaring his own inability could 
be prevented from resuming his powers and duties by the check of the Vice 
President and Cabinet (or another body).  Such a check appeared in proposals 
at the time.  A suggestion I made for eliminating such a check, where the 
President declared his own inability (reflecting other proposals at the time 
and a point made in my article), was not accepted.  Later, in a letter dated 
March 29, 1966, to Larry Conrad, chief counsel of the Senate’s 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendment, who asked me for a 
chronological listing of my activities, I said, 
At the consensus sessions I strongly advocated a constitutional amendment 
embodying a specific method of determining inability, and spoke in favor 
of the determination of inability being made by the Vice-President and, if 
another body was considered necessary, by the Cabinet.  Participated in the 
drafting of the consensus at an informal session after the formal session on 
January 20, and at a breakfast conference on January 21.  Emphasized at 
the informal session of January 20, when it was not clear whether a 
consensus existed, that it was incumbent upon the panel to propose a 
method of determining inability.  At formal session of January 21 suggested 
a two-thirds vote of each House to prevent the President from resuming his 
powers and duties.36 
BUILDING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS 
Following the ABA conference, Senator Bayh and members of Congress 
responded favorably to the consensus recommendations, with some 
exceptions.  The use of a joint session of Congress for filling a vacancy in the 
vice presidency was not adopted nor was the idea of the person next in the 
line of succession having authority to act with the Cabinet when there was a 
vice presidential vacancy.  A number of the recommendations ran parallel to 
ideas already in the draft S.J. Res. 139 and earlier legislative proposals.  The 
 
 36. Letter from John D. Feerick to Larry A. Conrad, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 29, 1966) (on file with 
author).  
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consensus was presented to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments on February 24, 1964, by Walter Craig and Lewis F. Powell.37  
I was invited to testify in my own right on February 28,38 as were other 
members of our group.  Present when I testified were Senators Bayh, 
presiding, Olin Johnston of South Carolina, Kenneth Keating of New York, 
and Hiram Fong of Hawaii.39  I read a written statement and responded to 
questions.  Below are some of the points of my testimony: 
The circumstances surrounding the death of President Kennedy should 
have taught us that we can no longer afford the uncertainty that presently 
exists regarding the critical problem of Presidential inability. 
. . . I am convinced that this problem can be solved. 
. . . . 
. . . To miss this opportunity and again leave unsolved one of the most 
serious problems ever to confront the Congress would be to trifle with the 
security of this great Nation.  Therefore, we must make every human effort 
to agree on a workable solution. 
A tremendous advance in the effort at agreement was made a little over 
a month ago.  At that time the most workable solution which I have seen to 
date was proposed by a group of lawyers who were called together by the 
American Bar Association 
. . . . 
. . . The very fact that 12 individuals who represented nearly as many 
points of view could reach such a consensus is, in my opinion, a tremendous 
thing. 
. . . I support it wholeheartedly. 
. . . . 
First, the panel agreed that a constitutional amendment is necessary to 
solve the problem. . . .  Some members of the panel believed that Congress 
has no power at all to legislate on the subject—that it merely has the power 
to legislate on the line of succession beyond the Vice President. 
Most of the panel believed that the Vice President now has the 
constitutional power to determine inability and, therefore, this power could 
not be, constitutionally, taken from him by legislation.  The panel further 
believed that if a legislative solution to the problem were enacted, it would 
be subject to constitutional challenge which would come very likely during 
a time of inability—when we least could afford it. 
. . . . 
Second, the panel recommended that an amendment make it clear that in 
cases of inability the powers and duties of the Presidency devolve on the 
 
 37. See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearings on 
S.J. Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 84 (1964) (statement of Walter Craig, President, American Bar 
Association). 
 38. Id. at 149–58 (statement of John D. Feerick). 
 39. Id. at 149. 
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Vice President for the duration of the inability, while in cases of death, 
resignation, and removal, the office of President devolves for the rest of the 
term. 
This would eliminate the fear that the Vice President would oust the 
President if he acted as President in a case of inability.  It would also give 
constitutional recognition to the Tyler precedent. 
. . . . 
Third, the panel recommended that the President be able to declare his 
own inability in writing.  There is no good reason why this should not be. 
. . . . 
Fourth, to meet the case where a President is disabled but is unwilling or 
actually unable to make a determination, the panel would give the decisive 
role to the Vice President and the Cabinet.  In such a case, the Vice 
President, with majority approval of the Cabinet, could make the 
determination. 
The panel believed that the Vice President should not have the sole 
power as he would be an interested party and, therefore, too reluctant to 
make a determination. 
On the other hand, it was felt that he should not be eliminated entirely as 
it would be his duty to act as President and, therefore, he should have a say 
in determining when to act.  The Cabinet was thought to be the best possible 
body to assist him in making the determination. 
That Cabinet members are close to the President, that they would likely 
be aware of an inability and would know if the circumstances were such 
that the Vice President should act, that they are part of the executive branch, 
and that the public would have confidence in the rightness of their decision 
were reasons for the selection of this body.  A primary consideration for 
[this] approach was that it would involve no violation of the principle of 
separation of powers. 
It has been said that Cabinet members, out of loyalty or fear of losing 
their jobs, might be too hesitant to find the President disabled.  This is flatly 
contradicted by the fact that the Garfield and Wilson Cabinet actually urged 
the respective Vice President to act as President. 
Fifth, the panel recommended that the President should be able to resume 
his powers and duties upon his own declaration in writing.  Because of the 
possibility that a President might say he was able when he was not, it was 
the panel’s consensus that the Vice President, subject to approval by a 
majority of the Cabinet, should have the power to prevent him from acting 
in such a case. 
In a case where the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet disagree 
with the President’s declaration of recovery, review by Congress would be 
required.  The Vice President would continue to act in the interim, however.  
It would take a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress to keep the 
President from resuming his powers and duties. 
A two-thirds vote was decided upon in order to weight the provision 
heavily in favor of the President and also because it would conform with 
1084 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
the two-thirds vote required by the Constitution to remove a President from 
office. 
Sixth, the panel recommended the inclusion of a provision that Congress 
could change the Cabinet as the body to function with the Vice President.  
It was felt that this had the advantage of flexibility so that if it should 
become necessary to do so, Congress could, by legislation change the 
procedure relatively quickly without having to resort to a constitutional 
amendment.  (I would like to say, parenthetically, here, that I, personally, 
would like to keep Congress out of the matter altogether . . . .) 
Seventh, the panel recommended that the Vice Presidency be filled at all 
times.  It suggested that the President be allowed to nominate a new Vice 
President, subject to confirmation by the Congress.  My own examination 
of all the debates surrounding the various succession laws . . . suggests that 
the best way to solve the succession problem is by filling the Vice 
Presidency . . . .40 
The remainder of my written statement addressed objections that had been 
raised to the panel consensus and offered positive reasons for a detailed 
amendment, concluding that the ABA consensus 
[w]ithout further legislation [] is complete, is practical, is consistent with 
the principle of separation of powers, gives the decisive role to those in 
whom the people would most likely have confidence, involves only persons 
who have been elected by the people or approved by their representatives, 
and embodies checks on all concerned—the President, Vice President and 
the Cabinet. 
Finally, since it would be embodied in a constitutional amendment, there 
would be no question about its constitutionality.41 
I then answered questions put to me by Senators Bayh and Johnston, 
appreciating as I did Senator Johnston’s statement, “I am very much pleased 
with your remarks.”42  I would later have other experiences testifying before 
Congress, but there was nothing quite like the first time. 
THE POSTHEARING PERIOD 
Following the subcommittee hearings, I began to assist the Washington 
office of the ABA, headed by Donald Channell and his deputy, Lowell R. 
Beck, in promoting the proposed amendment.  I also began to assist Larry 
Conrad, chief counsel of the subcommittee, in the formulation of the 
amendment, and in time, Congressman Richard Poff of Virginia of the House 
Judiciary Committee.  The ABA essentially set up a clearinghouse in its 
 
 40. Id. at 150–52.  Recognition of “the Tyler precedent” (in the second point of my 
testimony) was important because Vice President John Tyler became President when William 
Henry Harrison died in office. Id. at 101 (statement of Lewis Powell, President-Elect, 
American Bar Association). 
 41. Id. at 153 (statement of John D. Feerick). 
 42. Id. at 154. 
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Washington office,43 receiving calls from members of Congress and their 
staffs and from bar leaders and the media regarding the proposed amendment.  
They sent material to members of Congress and their staffs, called on state 
and local bar leaders to lobby their congressional members, and made regular 
visits to Congress and key judiciary staff.  I frequently was on the phone with 
Channell and Beck, and also their talented assistant, Michael Spence, as the 
amendment worked its way through Congress in 1964 and 1965 and then 
through the state legislatures.  I gave speeches to bar and citizen groups, 
explained the proposed amendment to journalists and lawyers who were 
assisting in the effort, wrote articles for bar journals,44 and appeared before 
the New York City Bar’s influential Federal Legislation Committee to 
advocate a change in its position.45  I also began to write a book on the history 
of presidential succession, at the suggestion of my law school professor and 
mentor, Leonard Manning, after I had written a second article in 1964, 
entitled, “The Vice-Presidency and the Problems of Presidential Succession 
and Inability.”46  His advice to me was to begin the book by combining my 
two Fordham Law Review articles.  He also introduced me to the Fordham 
University Press and its head, Father Edwin Quain, S.J., who expressed an 
interest in publishing such a book. 
Other requests came my way in 1964, including doing an analysis for the 
American Enterprise Institute of the pending legislative proposals on the 
subjects of presidential inability and vice presidential vacancy.  My wife, 
Emalie, became the glue for me on this project and wrote out a summary of 
the proposals.47  We discussed little else than presidential succession in the 
very early years of our marriage, except our desire to have a family.  Another 
request I received was to serve in an advisory capacity to a prominent 
committee of business leaders of the Committee for Economic Development 
(CED), aided by distinguished political science professors.  Some of the 
professors favored a solution different from the one offered by the ABA, 
 
 43. SPECIAL COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY & VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, RECOMMENDATION THAT THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 
AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY AND ITS ADVISORY COMMITTEE BE CONTINUED 2 (1964). 
 44. See generally John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability:  The Problem and a Solution, 
50 A.B.A. J. 321 (1964); John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—It Must Be 
Solved Now, 36 N.Y. ST. B.J. 181 (1964).  I was required by the New York State Bar Journal 
to remove my point of view from the article because it was not consistent with the New York 
State Bar’s position.   
 45. In December 1963, Representative Emanuel Celler of the House Judiciary Committee 
addressed the Legislation Committee and encouraged it to study the problem of presidential 
inability and succession.  The Committee started its review by creating a subcommittee and 
securing copies of my 1963 Fordham Law Review article, which had been brought to their 
attention by my law firm colleague, Barry Garfinkel.  I was asked to address the bar 
subcommittee and strongly urged at its meeting of early February 1964 to change its existing 
position and adopt the ABA consensus.  The full committee came to adopt the ABA consensus, 
with a few suggested modifications, in its report of May 1, 1964, which was approved by the 
New York City Bar Association at its annual meeting on May 12, 1964.   
 46. See generally John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the Problems of Presidential 
Succession and Inability, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 457 (1964). 
 47. See Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancies, CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal641304708 [https://perma.cc/SX4X-V48Q] (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
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which made the experience a taxing one for me, as summarized in my March 
1966 letter to Larry Conrad: 
Some of those who worked on [a policy] statement, particularly political 
scientists, strenuously opposed S.J. Res. 139.  I strongly supported S.J. Res. 
139’s approach and succeeded in getting much of it accepted by the 
Subcommittee [of the CED]. . . .  The Subcommittee, however, refused to 
include the Vice-President in its inability solution, giving the role solely to 
the Cabinet.  Spoke against the omission of the Vice President at the 
decisive meeting of the Research and Policy Committee of CED, 
suggesting that [the] Vice-President should be part of any approach and 
emphasizing the need for consensus (referring to the ABA Consensus) at 
this time in history.  The Research and Policy committee agreed, so that the 
CED recommendation which emerged was substantially the same in 
principle as the S.J. Res. 139 approach.48 
As more requests piled up, I spent whatever nonwork time I could find 
trying to finish my book.  This would not have been possible without Emalie, 
who gave up her employment to help me.  Pregnant with our first child in 
1964, Emalie dedicated an enormous amount of time to the project, while I 
did what was necessary to keep my position at Skadden.  She researched the 
congressional debates surrounding the Twelfth Amendment, drafted a book 
chapter on the hidden inability of President Grover Cleveland, made editing 
suggestions, helped with the development of a bibliography, and did much of 
the proofreading.  The final result, From Failing Hands:  The Story of 
Presidential Succession, appeared in March 1965.49  I was overwhelmed to 
see a dozen or so copies displayed in the first floor window at 302 Broadway, 
a space then occupied by the Fordham University Press.  A few months prior, 
our first child, Maureen Grace, was born on December 29, 1964.  I recall 
Emalie working on the index to the book, alongside my brother Donald and 
my friend Joe Hart, and having to leave this project when Maureen was about 
to arrive on the scene.50 
Some months before all of this, in March 1964, the ABA set up a 
nationwide committee in its Junior Bar Conference (JBC), later called the 
Young Lawyers Section, which I was asked to chair.51  Its mission was to 
gain grassroots support for S.J. Res. 139.  Another ABA committee was 
formed, chaired by Herbert Brownell, to buttress this effort.  JBC committee 
members, almost immediately after their appointment, reached out to 
members of Congress from their states to promote the passage of S.J. Res. 
139.  Members of the ABA House of Delegates wrote to the Senators and 
 
 48. Letter from John D. Feerick to Larry A. Conrad, supra note 36. 
 49. See generally FEERICK, supra note 25. 
 50. The collaboration Emalie and I developed in the field of presidential succession led 
us to coauthor a book on the Vice Presidents of the United States for high school students.  
Published in 1967, it was dedicated to our baby during its writing, Maureen Grace. See 
generally JOHN D. FEERICK & EMALIE P. FEERICK, THE VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1967).  I dedicated subsequent writings to our other children and first grandchild, 
David LeBlanc, and Uncle Pat, my brother Donald, and Professor Manning.  
 51. See Letter from John G. Weinmann, Chairman, Junior Bar Conference, D.C. Office, 
Am. Bar Ass’n, to author (Apr. 20, 1964) (on file with author). 
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Representatives in Congress to promote S.J. Res. 139, leading to many 
cosponsors.52  I recall Senator Bayh saying later that one Senate colleague, 
Harry Byrd, told him to sign him up as a supporter of S.J. Res. 139, as Byrd 
had never before heard from so many lawyers in his state.  The work of young 
lawyers in particular was reflected in a June 1965 JBC report: 
In the period between August, 1964 and June, 1965, the state 
representatives on the Junior Bar Conference presidential inability 
committee have been instrumental in getting their state and local bar 
associations to endorse [Senate Joint Resolution 1] and [House Joint 
Resolution 1], their newspapers to lend editorial support of these proposals, 
and their fellow citizens to write letters to the members of the Congress 
urging action on them.  Articles by Junior Bar leaders appeared in bar 
publications in Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, New York, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, [and others].  Letters to the 
Editor by Junior Bar leaders appeared in newspapers across the country.  
Literally thousands of letters by citizens and organizations were sent to the 
members of Congress due to the leadership of junior bar leaders.  Junior bar 
representatives appeared on radio and television in support of prompt 
congressional action . . . in Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, etc.  
Numerous others delivered talks before various civic organizations.  
Speaker bureaus were set up in a number of states for the purpose of 
informing organizations of the problems . . . in Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, etc.  On the eve of key 
votes in the Senate and the House, Junior Bar leaders made telephone calls 
and sent letters and telegrams to their Congressmen and Senators.53 
The report identified by name thirty-one state representatives who 
rendered “truly outstanding leadership” in this period and another twenty-
seven individuals who made substantial contributions, including Fordham 
graduates James Tolan and James McGough.54 
 
 52. Letter from Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Members of the 
Comm. on Presidential Inability (Sept. 3, 1964) (on file with author). 
 53. Memorandum from Junior Bar Conference, Am. Bar Ass’n, 1964–1965 Final Report 
of the Junior Bar Conference Committee on Presidential Inability and the Vice-Presidential 
Vacancy (June 15, 1965) (on file with author). 
 54. Id.  In a December 1964 progress report on the JBC’s efforts, I wrote, 
Arizona:  C. Kimball Rose has appointed a chairman for each congressional 
district in the state.  Each chairman is active in contacting the state’s Congressmen 
and sending speakers to meetings of various civic organizations. 
California:  Richard P. Byrne is formulating an inability program for the southern 
part of the state, while Howard Nemerovski is busy on the northern part. 
Colorado:  R. Dale Tooley has succeeded in obtaining a commitment from the 
State Democratic Party and has set up a speaker’s bureau and publicity committee 
to encourage interest . . . . 
Connecticut:  Jay S. Siegel is working on a state-wide television panel program 
for the end of January. 
Illinois[:]  Harold I. Levine has had distributed to over 3000 young lawyers a 
newsletter dealing with the problems . . . . 
Iowa:  Robert E. Drey has obtained the support of 99 county chairmen each of 
whom is charged with spearheading a massive publicity campaign within his county. 
Louisiana:  Jack Weinman has delivered a score of talks on the problems to 
various civic groups. 
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A January 6, 1966, report of the JBC committee, six months after the 
amendment had been proposed by Congress, said: 
As of this writing, the proposed amendment has been ratified by . . . 
[thirteen states]. 
Members of this Committee played a large role in making the above 
ratifications possible . . . . 
Much groundwork for ratification in the remaining states . . . is being (or 
has been) laid by members of this Committee . . . .55 
Six months later, in a July 18, 1966, communication to Bert Nettles, 
Channell said: 
I realize that anyone who looks at the proposed amendment may have his 
own ideas as to other ways of accomplishing the best results.  Certainly 
there were many ideas among members of Congress and we can never 
expect a perfect solution which would please everyone.  I certainly believe 
that the proposed resolution which resulted from a consensus among 
 
Maine:  Horace A. Hildreth, Jr. has been active in contacting Maine’s 
congressional delegation. 
North Carolina:  John Hunter has established a working group in each of the 100 
counties of his state.  Each group is responsible for contacting civic organizations.  
John reports that each group has speakers prepared to deliver a five-minute or half-
hour talk . . . .   
Ohio:  Robert A. Blattner has had published in the . . . Cleveland Bar Association 
[Journal] an article . . . .  Bob has been appointed chairman of a subcommittee of the 
Cleveland Bar Association charged with formulating a public-relations program on 
the problem. . . .  John C.  Lilly . . . will also be spearheading a campaign in Ohio.  
Bill [Falsgraf] . . . is author of a forthcoming article on the JBC inability program in 
the ABA Journal. 
Oregon:  Robert L. Ridgley has formed a “geographically oriented committee” 
to obtain (1) endorsements from the various local bar associations throughout the 
state, and (2) commitments from members of the state in Congress. 
Pennsylvania:  Franklin Kury and his thirty-member committee have been 
extremely busy getting commitments from Pennsylvania Congressmen, suggesting 
pertinent editorials in the newspapers, writing letters to the editor, [and] speaking at 
meetings of various civic organizations throughout the state . . . .  Mercer Tate . . . 
spoke on television on the problems to an audience estimated at 95,000. 
. . . .  
South Carolina:  William F. Able is . . . publish[ing] . . . an article . . . .  Bill has 
also appeared before the Executive Committee of the [South Carolina Bar] 
Association to enlist its support . . . .  His program is aimed at having (1) people 
write to their Congressmen; (2) newspapers to carry editorials on the problems; and 
(3) speakers dispatched to meetings of civic organizations. 
Texas:  Lawrence Jackson is working on a full-scale publicity program for the 
state, and is busy getting a chairman appointed at every bar association in the state. 
Memorandum from John D. Feerick, Chairman, Junior Bar Conference Nat’l Comm. on 
Presidential Inability & Vice Presidential Vacancy, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Participants in Junior 
Bar Conference Program on Presidential Inability & Vice Presidential Vacancy 1–4 (Dec. 17, 
1964) (on file with author).  This memorandum also identified twenty-two other young 
lawyers at work setting up programs in other states. Id. at 4–5. 
 55. Memorandum from Young Lawyers Section, Am. Bar Ass’n, Mid-Year (1965–1966) 
Report of Committee on Presidential Inability and Vice-Presidential Vacancy (Jan. 6, 1966) 
(on file with author). 
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outstanding lawyers, Constitutional scholars and members of Congress is 
the best approach that can be devised.56 
Six months later, a January 1967 JBC report said that only six states 
remained for ratification and added that “[s]ince the state legislatures are now 
convening, young lawyer representatives of this Committee are at work to 
secure the ratification of the proposed amendment. . . .  Our job during the 
next few weeks will be to do everything in our power to accomplish this 
objective.”57  Left unsaid was the incredible work of the ABA as an 
institution.  Throughout this entire period, the staff of the ABA, under the 
sterling leadership of Channell and Beck, was relentless and persistent; they 
sent kits of supporting material to bar leaders around the country including a 
proposed ratification model resolution and a history of the steps necessary 
for ratification in each state.  Reprints of my articles were used in this effort, 
plus the handout that was developed for the May 1964 Eisenhower luncheon.  
Walter Craig was exceptional in his efforts, as was his successor, Lewis 
Powell.  Craig played a key role in the ratification of the amendment in 
Arizona, California, Nevada, and elsewhere, while Powell brokered a key 
meeting between Senator Bayh and Congressman Emanuel Celler that broke 
a congressional impasse which could have defeated the amendment.58 
Among the many young lawyers who made significant contributions were 
Mercer Tate and Franklin Kury in Pennsylvania59 and Richard Hansen, a JBC 
member who gave dozens of speeches throughout Nebraska in support of the 
amendment60 and had the joy of seeing his state become the first to ratify it 
on July 12, 1965.61  I did not focus on this seminal date until the writing of 
this chapter, as that day I was probably celebrating the last of my birthdays 
in my twenties.  The late Dale Tooley of Colorado stood out as well for his 
remarkable leadership.  He took on the task of dealing with two major 
newspapers, the Denver Post and the Rocky Mountain News, that were pitted 
against each other, with the latter favoring the amendment and the former 
opposing it.62  The Post did not like the provisions of the proposed section 4, 
involving, it said, too many interested parties.  It also complained that the 
 
 56. Letter from Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Bert Nettles 
(July 18, 1966) (on file with author). 
 57. Letter from John D. Feerick to Stanley H. Burdick (Jan. 19, 1967) (on file with author) 
(enclosing a report of the Young Lawyers Committee on Presidential Inability and Vice-
Presidential Vacancy). 
 58. See BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND 
SUCCESSION 302–04 (1968). 
 59. See, e.g., Letter from Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to 
Franklin L. Kury (Aug. 19, 1965) (on file with author). 
 60. See generally Richard H. Hansen, Lawyer, 61, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/12/obituaries/richard-h-hansen-lawyer-61.html 
[https://perma.cc/X53R-BFAB] (“Mr. Hansen testified before Congress in 1963 to urge [the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s] adoption.”). 
 61. See BAYH, supra note 58, at 337. 
 62. See Letter from R. Dale Tooley, Schmidt & Van Cise, to author (July 22, 1965) (on 
file with author); Letter from R. Dale Tooley, Schmidt & Van Cise, to Editor, Denver Post 
(July 21, 1965) (on file with author); see also 25th Amendment Has Serious Defects, DENVER 
POST, July 20, 1965, at 20; GOP Senator Explains Vote on Amendment, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS, July 22, 1965, at 48. 
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provision for filling a vice presidential vacancy was undemocratic.63  Tooley, 
who would later become District Attorney of Denver and have a plaza named 
in his memory, encouraged the Colorado Bar Association to adopt the cause 
as a high priority and the state’s representatives in Congress to vote for it.  In 
a letter to Senator Bayh, dated February 2, 1966, Tooley summarized his 
activities: 
Copy of an article in support of the amendment which appeared in the 
January 26 edition of the Rocky Mountain News.  As you can see, I had 
copies of this article reproduced and, through Representative Lisco, had 
them distributed to each member of the House. 
Copy of a letter of January 27, 1966, which we prepared and which the 
Chairman of the Young Lawyers Section of the Colorado Bar Association 
signed, which went to each of the council members, officers, chairmen and 
members of committees of that section.  Attached to it is a page of a letter 
which went to all members of the Legislative Committee of the Colorado 
Bar Association from Charles Gallagher, the effective and hard-working 
Chairman of that committee. 
Additional editorial in support of the amendment which appeared in the 
January 31 edition of the Rocky Mountain News and a news story on the 
appeal by the Congressman for ratification. 
Finally, the editorial which appeared on January 30, 1966, which was the 
Sunday edition of the News.  As you can see, the News has been extremely 
cooperative with us, and at least the Denver Post has been silent in the last 
few days. 
Copy of a postcard which was sent last week to each member of the 
Colorado Bar Association under the signature of President Heinicke and a 
copy of a letter from Representative Rich Gebhardt in which he agreed to 
change his vote. 
A copy of the statement in opposition to the amendment prepared by 
Representative John S. Carroll.  This is the statement which was so 
effectively answered by the letter which your office prepared on behalf of 
Senator Bayh.64 
PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS 
My files are filled with communications and correspondence regarding the 
work of young lawyers in this grand effort at constitutional reform and also 
of senior lawyers and the ABA’s incredible staff.  I was privileged to be part 
of this effort; below, I offer, from my personal files, a snapshot of history. 
By letter dated April 10, 1964, I was asked by Lowell R. Beck for my 
views concerning issues raised in a letter he received about the 1963 ABA 
consensus.65  The writer inquired about a situation involving a disabled 
 
 63. 25th Amendment Has Serious Defects, supra note 62. 
 64. The text in the block quote reproduces the author’s recollection of a letter dated 
February 2, 1966, from Dale Tooley to Senator Birch Bayh, on which the author was copied. 
 65. Letter from Lowell R. Beck, Assistant Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to author 
(Apr. 10, 1964) (on file with the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library); see 
also supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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President whose Vice President had died and whether a statutory successor 
acting as President could nominate a new Vice President under the consensus 
recommendation for filling a vacancy.66  I expressed hesitancy about his 
doing so in that context, as the President might recover from his inability and 
have his own ideas for Vice President.67  The writer also questioned whether 
a Vice President and Cabinet, out of loyalty or fear of reprisal, would ever 
use their power to declare a President disabled, except in extreme 
circumstances. 
In response to Beck’s request, I wrote to Larry Conrad on May 22, 1964, 
and explained the consensus recommendation that the Vice President should 
continue to act as President during the period in which Congress had to 
resolve a presidential inability disagreement and noted that the ABA’s view 
was “premised on the thinking that the Congress would act immediately to 
decide the issue.”68  I also noted the possibility that Congress might delay 
doing so but reasoned that it would be under pressure from the people to act 
and that it would also have a “moral and legal obligation” to do so.69  To 
cover this situation, after reviewing past and pending legislative proposals, I 
suggested to Conrad the following language: 
Whenever the President makes public announcement in writing that his 
inability has terminated, he shall resume the discharge of the powers and 
duties of his office on the second day after making such announcement, or 
at such earlier time after such announcement as he and the Vice President 
may determine, except that if the Vice President, with the written approval 
of a majority of the heads of executive departments in office at the time of 
such announcement, transmits to the Congress his written declaration that 
in his opinion the President’s inability has not terminated, the Vice 
President shall continue to act as President and the Congress shall 
immediately thereupon consider the issue.70 
A letter of mine, dated June 2, 1964, to Conrad, concerning the ABA 
recommendation for filling a vice presidential vacancy, stated: 
1.  The Constitution states in Article 2 that the Vice President of the 
United States shall be “elected” in a certain manner.  Thus to fill a vacancy 
in the Vice Presidency by statute would clearly violate this Article. 
2.  It may be that Congress has the power to create an office of Acting 
Vice President, as some suggest, under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
and to make the Acting Vice President the Officer next in line of succession 
after the Vice President under Article 2, Section 1, Clause 6.  However, the 
Acting Vice President would not be able to preside over the Senate in that 
 
 66. See BECK, supra note 23, at 91. 
 67. Letter from John D. Feerick to Lowell R. Beck, Assistant Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar 
Ass’n (Apr. 13, 1964) (on file with the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 68. Letter from John D. Feerick to Larry A. Conrad, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (May 22, 1964) (on file with 
author). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  Some of this language is reflected in section 5 of S.J. Res. 1 as it appeared when 
passed by the Senate in 1965. See S.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong. (1965). 
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capacity, since this function is given only to the Vice President provided 
for in the Constitution.  A mere statute could not make it otherwise. 
3.  Whether or not Congress has the power to fill a vacancy in the Vice 
Presidency is subject to considerable doubt so that a constitutional 
amendment is necessary to resolve all doubt on the point.71 
In a letter dated June 5, 1964, to Robert Nordhord, a staff member of the 
Office of the Legislative Counsel in the House of Representatives, I 
responded to subjects that he had asked about in a telephone conversation 
earlier that same day.  These subjects included the consensus 
recommendation for a two-thirds vote in a joint session of Congress (for 
which he said there were no rules) and the required vote in Congress for 
filling a vice presidential vacancy.  I suggested a majority of a quorum, as is 
required with other nominations.  With respect to an inability disagreement 
between the President, the Vice President, and the Cabinet, the letter said: 
[T]he Vice President would continue to act as President until Congress had 
decided the issue.  The ABA consensus contained no specific 
recommendation as to how the disagreement issue might be presented to 
the Congress.  It is my feeling that the Vice President should be required to 
transmit to the Congress, in writing, a disagreement declaration within a 
certain period of time.  If Congress were not then in session, he would be 
obliged to convene a special session before such period has expired.  If he 
failed to transmit a declaration to Congress within this period, the President 
would thereupon resume his powers and duties as soon as the period had 
ended.  Assuming that a declaration was presented to Congress in time, 
Congress would be required to decide the issue, not within any specified 
period of time, but as soon as possible.  If the Congress failed to decide the 
issue, or delayed for an unreasonable amount of time, the Vice President 
would still continue to act as President under the ABA consensus.  This is 
one of these areas, I submit, where we must assume that Congress will act 
immediately.  It would be directed by the Constitution to do so and the 
people would not tolerate a different course of action.72 
On June 23, 1964, I responded to a letter from Channell asking why the 
U.S. Supreme Court was given no role in determining a President’s inability 
under the ABA consensus.73  I made reference to separation of powers, the 
views of Chief Justice Earl Warren in opposition to Justices serving on a 
disability commission,74 the analogy of the impeachment process involving 
only Congress, and the desirability of having a body like the Cabinet that 
could act quickly and unanimously.75  Channell’s letter was likely influenced 
by a resolution of the Massachusetts Bar Association calling for the Supreme 
 
 71. Letter from John D. Feerick to Larry A. Conrad, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (June 2, 1964) (on file with 
author). 
 72. Letter from John D. Feerick to Robert Nordhord, Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. 
House of Representatives (June 5, 1964) (on file with author). 
 73. Letter from John D. Feerick to Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n 
(June 23, 1964) (on file with author). 
 74. Id.; see also FEERICK, supra note 25, at 248. 
 75. See Letter from John D. Feerick to Donald E. Channell, supra note 73. 
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Court to decide a President’s inability and when he might resume his powers 
and duties.  Most other state bars supported the consensus. 
S.J. Res. 139 was approved by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments on May 27, 1964, and by the full Judiciary Committee on 
August 4.76  The Senate approved the amendment by voice vote on 
September 28, 1964, (with only a few Senators present)77 and again the 
following day, by a vote of 65 to 0.78  The amendment was reintroduced in 
the eighty-ninth Congress as Senate Joint Resolution 1 (“S.J. Res. 1”), in a 
form identical to House Joint Resolution 1 (“H.R.J. Res. 1”), which was also 
introduced in January 1965. 
By letter dated January 5, 1965, to House Judiciary Committee Chair 
Celler, Channell noted: 
A press release will be issued tomorrow commending you for sponsoring 
the proposed amendment and there will be a story in the American Bar 
News which is sent to the 118,000 members.  Also, I plan to devote 
considerable space to this subject in the Washington Letter which is sent to 
all bar associations and to some 6,000 bar leaders.79 
By letter dated January 26, 1965, I informed Channell of a meeting I had 
with Senator Hruska’s assistant, and possibly also Hruska himself, hoping to 
persuade the Senator not to oppose S.J. Res. 1.80  The Senator had expressed 
concerns about the wording of the provisions giving Congress a role in 
determining an inability in the event of an inability disagreement and its 
power to substitute a different body for the Cabinet.  The Senator, who spoke 
to the ABA consensus group, was a strong supporter of the office of the 
President and separation of powers and gave strong supporting testimony 
concerning the proposed amendment. 
On January 28, 1965, President Johnson sent a special message to 
Congress, which urged adoption and ratification of S.J. Res. 1 and H.R.J. 
Res. 1.  He stated that the provisions have been “carefully considered and are 
the product of many of our finest constitutional and legal minds.”81  
Thereupon, in February 1965, the Senate unanimously approved S.J. Res. 1, 
as amended.82  Then the House Judiciary Committee commenced hearings 
on H.R.J. Res. 1 and more than thirty other proposals for dealing with the 
inability problem, some containing a time limitation placed on congressional 
action if there were a challenge to a presidential declaration of recovery. 
On February 7, 1965, I responded to a request from Congressman Poff 
asking for language to cover certain contingencies.  I stated that I saw 
 
 76. S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 14 (1964). 
 77. 110 CONG. REC. 23,002 (1964). 
 78. Id. at 23,061. 
 79. Letter from Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Emanuel Celler, 
U.S. Representative (Jan. 5, 1965) (on file with author). 
 80. Letter from John D. Feerick to Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, 
(Jan. 26, 1965) (on file with author). 
 81. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Presidential 
Disability and Related Matters (Jan. 28, 1965), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid 
=27063 [https://perma.cc/MQ7S-NMGT]. 
 82. 111 CONG. REC. 3286 (1965). 
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essentially three situations:  “(1) the inability of a Vice-President at a time 
when the President is disabled, (2) the inability of an Acting President, and 
(3) the inability of a President when there is no Vice-President.”83  I proposed 
the following provisions for incorporation in H.R.J. Res. 1: 
6.  The inability of the Vice-President shall be determined in the same 
manner as that of the President except that the Vice-President shall have no 
right to participate in such determination. 
7.  In case of the death, resignation, removal or inability of the Vice-
President, the person next in line of succession shall act in lieu of the Vice-
President under Sections 4 and 5 with the heads of the Executive 
Departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide.  (Please 
note that the American Bar Association concensus [sic] had a provision of 
this kind.)84 
The letter also contained suggestions for greater clarity in the legislative 
history regarding the wording of the then-proposed amendment, which I felt 
was important.  In abbreviated form, these suggestions dealt with the 
proposed time limit of ten days for congressional action with respect to an 
inability disagreement (I thought the limit was unnecessary because of the 
term “immediately” in the proposal); whether the Vice President acts as 
President during the period in which Congress decides a disagreement (as 
recommended by the ABA consensus);85 whether Congress would have the 
power to remove the Vice President from an inability determination (my view 
was different from the ABA consensus); the reach of the term “vacancy” for 
nominating a new Vice President (I said that the term was limited to death, 
resignation, and removal); the calling of a special session by the Vice 
President if Congress were out of session (I said it should be mandatory when 
a disagreement issue is raised); the need for the transmittal of an inability 
declaration to Congress to be spelled out in some manner (I suggested that 
rules were needed); the taking of the presidential oath of office by an Acting 
President (I said this should be the case); whether an Acting President can 
preside over the Senate (not under the Constitution); and the salary for a Vice 
President acting as President (I recommended that it be at the presidential 
rate).86 
On February 13, 1965, I wrote to Lowell R. Beck, as he requested, to offer 
comments on testimony given by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach that 
a proposed amendment should make clear that a President declaring his own 
 
 83. Letter from John D. Feerick to Richard Poff, U.S. Representative (Feb. 7, 1965) (on 
file with the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (“Section 5 [of the proposed amendment] is not clear as to who is entitled to 
exercise presidential power in the period after the President declares his ability and before the 
Vice-President brings the matter before Congress.  The Vice-President is intended to act in the 
period, I am sure, but . . . the language does not and will not permit him to do so.  Since Section 
5 is designed to meet an extraordinary case such as that of an insane President, it would be 
extremely dangerous to leave a gap here as such a President might declare himself able and 
immediately discharge the heads of the Executive Departments, thus preventing the Vice-
President from taking the necessary steps to get the matter before Congress.”). 
 86. Id. 
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inability can resume his powers and duties upon his recovery declaration 
without any check by the Vice President and Cabinet.87  I recommended such 
clarification, which the ABA leadership accepted.  As I recalled later in my 
Conrad summary letter of March 1966: 
I think it is important to note that I made a motion to this effect on the 
second day of the Washington Conference in January, 1964, and that the 
motion was unanimously (with the exception of my vote) defeated.  The 
panel took the position that the recovery provisions should apply whenever 
a disabled President sought to resume his powers and duties, regardless of 
how his disability had been determined.  Personally, I am in favor of the 
clarification (though I think language is required to carry it into effect) but, 
for the record, it is not consistent with the consensus.88 
By letter dated February 16, 1965, Poff said, “Your letter of February 7 
has been extremely helpful to me.  During the course of interrogation, I have 
tried to write some of the legislative history you suggested.”89  As noted, the 
Senate approved S.J. Res. 1, as modified, on February 19, 1964, and the 
House Judiciary Committee approved H.R.J. Res. 1, as amended, on March 
24. 
On April 1, 1965, Channell wrote that substantial opposition could develop 
in the House of Representatives, given a 6 to 4 vote in the House Rules 
Committee to grant only a four-hour open rule for debate on the floor of the 
House.  He said that “most members of the House of Representatives are not 
fully advised as to the need for this amendment.”90 
In a letter of April 5 to Poff, as action approached in the House, I suggested 
that he consider using the wisdom of Benjamin Franklin from the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787: 
I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such; because I 
think a general Government necessary for us . . . .  I doubt too whether any 
other Convention we can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution.  
For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their 
joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices, 
their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish 
views.  From such an Assembly can a perfect production be expected?  It 
therefore astonishes me . . . to find this system approaching so near to 
perfection as it does . . . .  Thus I consent . . . to this Constitution because I 
expect no better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the best . . . . 
On the whole, Sir, I cannot help expressing a wish that every member of 
the Convention who may still have objections to it, would with me, on this 
 
 87. Letter from John D. Feerick to Lowell R. Beck, Assistant Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar 
Ass’n (Feb. 13, 1965) (on file with author). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Letter from Richard H. Poff, U.S. Representative, to author (Feb. 16, 1965) (on file 
with author). 
 90. Letter from Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to the Officers and 
Bd. of Governors, Comm. on Presidential Inability (Apr. 1, 1965) (on file with author). 
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occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility—and to make manifest our 
unanimity, put his name to this instrument.91 
In his acknowledgment letter of April 7, Poff said: 
Frankly, John, looking back down the corridor of the years of labor and 
scholarship which have finally brought us to this point so near to success, I 
am a little aghast at the dimensions and weight of the responsibility which 
is mine.  What, if after all this struggle, if we should fail to persuade two-
thirds?  The thought has kept me awake at night.  I am sure, with so much 
of yourself invested in this chore, you must share the anxiety I feel.92 
I felt his anxiety.  He added that the Franklin quote was “very helpful” and 
that “[i]t fits precisely into the speech I want to make while the rule is under 
consideration.”93 
On April 9, 1965, I sent a detailed letter to the editor of the Wall Street 
Journal concerning its editorial of April 5, 1965, opposing the amendment.94  
I corrected errors in the editorial as I saw them.95  Although the letter was not 
published, the points contained in it were shared in discussions I had with 
ABA staff members and congressional staff in this period. 
Another letter of mine on April 9, 1965, to Representative Charles 
Mathias, following a call with him, was designed to dispel his concern that 
the amendment might repeal Congress’s line of succession authority under 
Article II.96  I assured him that there was no intention to change such 
authority, and therefore, that there was no need for such authority to be 
written into the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.97  Despite this effort at 
persuasion, Mathias did not vote for the proposed amendment, but later as it 
was being reviewed for ratification by the Maryland legislature, he declined 
to speak against it, as he had planned to do, in the face of strong support for 
the amendment in that body.98 
On April 13, 1965, the House approved its version of the amendment, 368 
to 29, containing a ten-day time limit for congressional action in the event of 
an inability disagreement.99  Poff also sent me a gracious letter about my 
participation and asked that I give consideration to the matter described in a 
letter he sent that day to Channell, on which he copied me along with 
 
 91. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 642–43 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
 92. Letter from Richard H. Poff, U.S. Representative, to author (Apr. 7, 1965) (on file 
with author). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Editorial, A Disabling Amendment, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1965, at 14. 
 95. Letter from John D. Feerick to Editor, Wall St. Journal (Apr. 9, 1965) (on file with 
author). 
 96. Letter from John D. Feerick to Charles Mathias Jr., U.S. Representative (Apr. 9, 1965) 
(on file with author). 
 97. Id. 
 98. I discovered in the National Archives, while writing this chapter, a reference 
indicating that my 1965 Fordham Law Review article was helpful in explaining the amendment 
to state legislators in Maryland.  
 99. 111 CONG. REC. 7968 (1965). 
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Brownell and Powell.  He said that on the date of the House vote the 
following occurred: 
Late in the afternoon the Speaker came to the Republican committee table 
and paid me a warm personal tribute for which I was very grateful.  In the 
course of the conversation, he asked if I would introduce the “forty-eight 
hour” amendment.  I told him that Chairman Celler had discussed it with 
me and I had agreed to introduce it.  As the Congressional Record shows, 
the Speaker later took the Floor to urge support of the amendment.  The 
Speaker’s address, eloquent and persuasive as well as dramatic, was the 
factor which made our margin of success possible.100 
Poff added that the amendment he offered was a “tactical concession and 
nothing more than that.”101  He said that he thought it was “unneeded to 
accomplish what the Speaker wanted” and added that it “may be a 
complicating factor which might cause serious problems at a critical time.”102  
I had shared earlier with Poff and others such a concern on my part.103 
In a letter to Poff dated April 19, 1965, as the conference committee of the 
two houses was about to attempt a resolution of their differences, I shared my 
views.  First, the forty-eight-hour provision, while unwise, should remain as 
it was, as favored by Speaker McCormack.  Second, the provision for placing 
a ten-day time limit on congressional action in the event of a disagreement, 
which was then strongly opposed by the Senate, should have a longer time 
period, perhaps fifteen days.104  Changing my earlier view on the subject of 
a limit, I said it would be a “safeguard for the disabled President.”105 
[I]f the Vice-President and Cabinet disagreed with a presidential 
declaration of recovery, the Congress would be obliged to decide the issue 
as soon as possible, giving the various parties ample opportunity to be 
heard. . . .  
. . . . 
It would appear to me that if after a Conference you had to give up the 
48 hour provision in order to retain the ten day provision (perhaps as 
extended), Speaker McCormack would be pleased as the House measure 
would have, in the main, remained intact.106 
By letter dated April 23, Poff commented: 
 
 100. Letter from Richard H. Poff, U.S. Representative, to Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. 
Office, Am. Bar Ass’n (Apr. 15, 1965) (on file with author). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Section 4 of the Amendment, as adopted, states, “Thereupon Congress shall decide 
the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXV, § 4.  I worried about the effect of Congress not assembling “immediately.” 
Letter from John D. Feerick to Richard H. Poff, U.S. Representative (Feb. 7, 1965) (on file 
with the Fordham University School of Law Maloney Library). 
 104. Letter from John D. Feerick to Richard H. Poff, U.S. Representative (Apr. 19, 1965) 
(on file with author). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  I also noted as desirable the change made in the language of section 3 that a 
voluntary declaration by the President gave him the ability to resume his powers and duties on 
his own initiative without any check. 
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Your letter of April 19 illustrates that you are not wholly without 
political “savvy.”  Why is it, John, that most people, particularly 
intellectuals, seem to derive some particular pride from a confession of 
political naiveté?  As a practical politician, I can only hope that this is a 
Freudian scream of secret admiration for things political.107 
He was probably right, but I also was a twenty-eight year old, humbled by 
everything and not wanting to appear presumptuous.  Poff’s letter noted my 
agreement with him on the use of a time limit, indicated his flexibility on the 
time period itself, and asked if I knew anyone who could approach the 
Speaker on the forty-eight-hour provision.108  I left the latter alone! 
On April 20, 1965, in response to Brownell’s request for my views, I wrote 
him advising that the ten-day provision would not be inconsistent with the 
ABA consensus.109 
In the weeks that followed, Poff and I had other communications, mainly 
with a focus on the time limitation.  On May 26, 1965, I had conversations 
with Lowell Beck and Larry Conrad and learned that the “conferees had a 
heated discussion regarding the ten day provision,” with the House not 
wanting to go beyond fourteen days with Representative McCulloch as the 
main line of resistance.110  Then, on May 27, 1965, when I learned that the 
two houses were at an impasse on whether it should be fourteen or twenty-
one days, I wrote a letter to Poff.  In it, I gave my reasons why there was not 
much difference between fourteen and twenty-one days.  I stated that twenty-
one days was not “an unreasonable outside limitation for that most 
extraordinary situation where Congress might delay, without good cause, in 
deciding a disagreement issue,” and suggested to him that since twenty-one 
days “would allow for a more complete investigation than either ten or 
fourteen days, I would be inclined to go along with such limitation.”111  I sent 
copies of my letter to Bayh, Brownell, and Beck, which concluded:  “I send 
you these thoughts in the hope that they may have some value.”112 
By letter dated May 28, Poff wrote me and stated: 
Since I am one of the conferees and since what I am about to say would 
have the effect of weakening our bargaining power I must ask you to keep 
it in confidence.  I would certainly accept 21 days if failure to do so would 
mean the loss of the Amendment.113 
 
 107. Letter from Richard H. Poff, U.S. Representative, to author (Apr. 23, 1965) (on file 
with author). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Letter from John D. Feerick to Herbert Brownell, Lord, Day & Lord (Apr. 20, 1965) 
(on file with author). 
 110. Memorandum regarding conversation with Lowell Beck and Larry Conrad (May 26, 
1965) (on file with author). 
 111. Letter from John D. Feerick to Richard H. Poff, U.S. Representative (May 27, 1965) 
(on file with author). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Letter from Richard H. Poff, U.S. Representative, to author (May 28, 1965) (on file 
with author). 
2017] A PERSONAL REMEMBRANCE 1099 
On June 1, I learned from Channell that Poff and William McCulloch, then 
the ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee, had agreed to twenty-
one days.114 
By memorandum dated June 2, 1965, Channell advised that Senator Bayh 
and Congressman Celler had met that day and had agreed on a time limit of 
twenty-one days but that it was “to remain confidential until each of them 
[could] discuss the matter with their respective conferees.”115  As a historical 
note, it appears that the Senate’s willingness to accept a time limit of twenty-
one days was due to the persistence of Senator Sam Ervin Jr. of North 
Carolina.116  He had dug in on twenty-one days, accepting an unprecedented 
limitation on Senate action.  Bayh and Senate Minority Leader Dirksen also 
agreed on this limit.  By confidential memorandum of June 14, Channell 
advised that all of the conferees but Representative McCulloch had agreed to 
the twenty-one-day provision.117 
In late spring of 1965, as passage of the amendment was imminent, the 
ABA Journal asked me to write an article for the bar of the country explaining 
the amendment.  I did so118 and followed up with a more detailed explanation 
in the Fordham Law Review.119  Other troubling issues, however, surfaced at 
this time.  One of these issues involved whether the twenty-one-day provision 
should run from when Congress assembled, if not in session, or from the date 
when the Vice President and Cabinet had raised the inability issue by written 
declaration.120  The Senate conferees wanted the former and the House 
wanted the latter.  Channell asked me for drafting suggestions and requested 
that I call him on Sunday night, June 6, as the conferees would be meeting 
on Monday or Tuesday of that week.  I called with my suggestions and 
followed up the next day by letter.  The language I advanced was passed 
along to Conrad and became part of the section 4 drafting process.  Channell 
noted by letter dated June 9, 1965, that he had discussed my suggestions 
“with Larry Conrad and believe[d] they were very helpful to him.”121 
The language I received to review provided: 
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within 48 hours 
for that purpose if not in session.  If the Congress, within 21 days after the 
 
 114. Memorandum regarding conversation with Don Channell (June 1, 1965) (on file with 
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 116. BAYH, supra note 58, at 286–90. 
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 120. Letter from Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to author (June 6, 
1965) (on file with author). 
 121. Letter from Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to author (June 9, 
1965) (on file with author). 
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receipt of the written declaration of the Vice President and a majority of the 
principal officers of the executive departments or such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, determines by 2/3 vote of both Houses that 
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office, the 
Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; 
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.122 
The language I suggested was as follows: 
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-
eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  If the Congress, within 
twenty-one days after receipt of the said declaration, or, if not in session, 
within twenty-one days after such assembling, determines by two-thirds 
vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the 
same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers 
and duties of his office.123 
The final wording was: 
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-
eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  If the Congress, within 
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if 
Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is 
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; 
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.124 
By letter dated June 16, 1965, which followed issuance of the joint 
conference committee report resolving the differences between the houses, I 
wrote a note of thanks to twenty-nine members of the JBC committee.125  
This turned out to be premature, however.  On June 25, 1965, I saw the final 
conference committee’s version of the amendment reprinted in a New York 
Times article126 and issues jumped out at me right away.  As summarized in 
my March 29, 1966, letter to Conrad: 
By letter to Don Channell dated June 25, 1965 (see copy attached) advised 
that the “either/or” language of Section 4 was ambiguous and suggested 
different language.  Was advised later in week that it was ‘too late’ for any 
changes and that those consulted on the point thought there was no 
ambiguity.  On July 1, 1965, while on vacation in Southampton, Long 
Island, received a call from Don Channell of the ABA to the effect that 
Senators Gore, McCarthy and others had succeeded the previous day in 
postponing debate on the amendment, having argued that the “either/or” 
expression was ambiguous.  Spoke later in day with you and spent the next 
 
 122. Letter from Donald E. Channell, supra note 120. 
 123. Letter from John D. Feerick to Donald E. Channell, Dir., D.C. Office, Am. Bar Ass’n 
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 125. See, e.g., Letter from John D. Feerick to Franklin L. Kury (June 16, 1965) (on file with 
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few days doing legal research in the Suffolk County bar library . . . to 
support the use of the “either/or” expression.  Results (case citations) 
telephoned in to you on Saturday, July 3, and Monday, July 5.127 
What I telephoned in to Conrad, based on my research, was that the use of 
“either/or” meant that only one body could have such power, either the 
Cabinet, as in the amendment, or another body created by law to replace the 
Cabinet, that is, the heads of the executive departments.  I rejected a possible 
construction, not intended by the ABA consensus, of two bodies being in 
existence at the same time each with the power to declare a President 
disabled.  The “either/or” language, I was told, came from an assistant to 
Senator Hruska, reflecting Hruska’s concern that the existing language might 
enable Congress to remove the Vice President from the process of 
determining a President’s inability. 
Finally, I remember being startled again when, at the last moment, I 
noticed a scrivener’s error in the draft of the conference report.128  When I 
reached Senator Bayh’s staff by telephone, possibly on July 6, with my 
observation, I was told that the amendment had just been approved that day 
by the Senate, 68 to 5, and was on its way to the states for ratification.  In 
other words, the amendment was beyond rescue for correction. 
On July 7, 1965, I sent a letter of congratulations to Poff on the passage of 
the amendment stating that the “time limitation of Section 4 can properly be 
referred to as the ‘Poff Provision.’”129 
On July 8, Poff wrote me a poignant letter asking 
why the Washington press has so studiously avoided any mention of any 
Republican on either side of the Capitol in connection with this project. . . . 
As you know, our party is so frequently and so mercilessly condemned 
as negative that it does seem that when we assume a positive posture and 
make a positive contribution, we should be accorded at least minor 
recognition.  Do you think I am being unreasonable?130 
I subsequently responded to Poff, noting that the ABA gave credit to both 
political parties and that no amendment would have happened without 
President Eisenhower, Attorney General Brownell, and other Republicans, 
including Poff especially and Congressman William McCulloch.  Later, Poff 
would write a very thoughtful review of my book, in which he provided 
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important perspectives on the differences between the two houses in the 
development of the amendment.131 
A memorandum of July 9, which I sent to the Junior Bar Conference of the 
ABA, stated optimistically that President Lewis Powell and former Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell “firmly believe that your outstanding work was 
instrumental in the overwhelming vote in the House of Representatives and 
the Senate . . . .  The task of getting this measure ratified is largely ours. . . .  
Packs of ratification material will be forwarded to you shortly.”132 
The day before I attended a celebratory gathering at the Washington office 
of the ABA, I made a memorandum for my files of a conversation I had with 
Senator Bayh, in which he stated that “problems kept occurring up to the time 
the amendment was voted upon which left the outcome in doubt.”133  He 
mentioned an Alabama editorial, which said that under the amendment, if 
President Johnson died, Humphrey could nominate Martin Luther King Jr. 
for Vice President.  As a result of this editorial, a number of Congressmen 
from southern states apparently informed Bayh that they would have to vote 
against the amendment.  Bayh dissuaded them from doing so.  Bayh also 
mentioned a voting strategy of moving the amendment immediately after 
Senators Gore and McCarthy voiced their objections to the use of 
“either/or.”134  According to Conrad, Bayh accused McCarthy a week before 
the vote of trying to “kill the amendment,” to which McCarthy replied in the 
negative and said he would vote for it (but he did not do so on July 6).135 
I add a few additional communications bearing on the ratification of the 
amendment: 
By letter dated August 19, 1965, from Channell to Franklin Kury, Young 
Lawyer chair in Pennsylvania, Chanell stated:  “We are extremely pleased 
that the Pennsylvania legislature has ratified the proposed constitutional 
amendment. . . .  I feel that your state was better organized than any to carry 
forward with the proposed amendment.”136 
Every congressman from Pennsylvania, but one, supported the amendment, 
including its two Senators.137 
 
 131. Honorable Richard H. Poff, From Failing Hands:  The Story of Presidential 
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By letter dated October 28, 1965, I responded to Senator Bayh’s request 
for my views on amending the statutory line of succession, stating: 
In order to avoid confusion I would be inclined to defer such action until 
the proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment has been ratified.  I think it would 
be appropriate, however, at that time to amend the law so as to add the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the Secretary of the 
Housing and Urban Development Department to the line of succession.138 
I also suggested adding a provision to compensate the Vice President at 
the presidential rate whenever he acts as President.139 
A memorandum in my file of January 18, 1966, records a call from Larry 
Conrad on that date for permission to distribute my 1965 Fordham Law 
Review article to members of the West Virginia Legislature because some 
members were confused “as to the meaning of the amendment to such an 
extent that ratification was in doubt.”140  I gave permission and copies were 
thermofaxed for distribution in that state.  Two days later the amendment was 
ratified in the state of West Virginia.141 
By letter dated February 13, 1967, Bert S. Nettles of Alabama noted the 
ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and expressed “regret that we 
were unable to be of more assistance here in Alabama.”142  Nettles did an 
outstanding job in rallying the support of the bar in favor of the amendment, 
but the bar of his state held back in the end so as not to give Governor George 
Wallace a forum for using the amendment as a “whipping boy” for his 
political agenda.143 
In a letter dated June 17, 1967, sent to young lawyer Stanley Burdick of 
Connecticut, enclosing the final report of the Young Lawyers Committee, I 
wrote: 
The work of the American Bar Association in the formation, promotion, 
and ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is now history.  I am 
pleased to say that the work of this committee is part of that history. . . .  
Those who had a part to play in that work can take pride in the fact that 
today we have procedures for handling a case of presidential inability and 
filling a vacancy in the office of Vice-President.144 
The amendment, as proposed, contained a seven-year time limit for 
ratification, following a similar time limit established for other constitutional 
amendments in the twentieth century.  It was ratified on February 10, 1967, 
when Minnesota and Nevada added their approval, giving rise to the question 
 
Pennsylvania, id. at 86, and led an effort to adopt in his state a gubernatorial disability 
provision, which subsequently was implemented, id. at 103.  
 138. Letter from John D. Feerick to Birch Bayh, U.S. Senator (Oct. 28, 1965) (on file with 
author). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Memorandum regarding call from Larry Conrad, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 18, 1966) (on file with author). 
 141. BAYH, supra note 58, at 338. 
 142. Letter from Bert S. Nettles, Johnston, Johnston & Nettles, to author (Feb. 13, 1967) 
(on file with author). 
 143. See FEERICK, supra note 33, at 106 n.‡. 
 144. Letter from John D. Feerick to Stanley Burdick (June 17, 1967) (on file with author). 
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of which one placed the Amendment in the Constitution.145  All told, forty-
seven states ratified the Amendment; the three not to do so were Georgia, 
North Dakota, and South Carolina.146 
SPECIAL MOMENTS 
Looking back, several moments remain vivid.  The first was meeting 
President Eisenhower in an anteroom of the Mayflower Hotel in May 1964 
just before he gave a speech in support of the proposed reform.  I was 
overwhelmed to shake his hand.  He was reserved in appearance, humble, 
and deferential.  No one was quite sure what he would say.  Senator Bayh, in 
his book, recounts the mystery surrounding his speech as to where President 
Eisenhower was going to come out on the subject.147  To everyone’s pleasant 
surprise, he put his enormous weight behind the drive for the amendment, 
describing his personal experiences with medical disabilities and his faith in 
the office of the Vice President and the executive branch being able to deal 
with the issue responsibly.  He did not opine for a disability commission, as 
some believed he might. 
The speech was tied to a program organized by the ABA, in connection 
with which I had the privilege of helping to develop a handout for the 
occasion, which contained a descriptive history of the problem of presidential 
inability followed by a question-and-answer section.148  The questions 
included:  Why is a constitutional amendment necessary?  May the President 
voluntarily declare his inability?  May the President be declared disabled 
other than by his voluntary action?  Why should the office of Vice President 
be filled at all times?  Why not hold a general election for a new Vice 
President?  The handout became a useful document for the ABA to circulate 
to people seeking information on the amendment. 
A second moment involves a communication I received in late 1965 from 
Stephen Lesher, Press Secretary to Senator Bayh, mentioning an article in the 
South Carolina Law Review by Professor George D. Haimbaugh Jr., entitled 
“Vice Presidential Succession:  A Criticism of the Bayh-Cellar [sic] Plan.”149  
Lesher said that it was receiving wide distribution among state legislators and 
asked if I would write a response.  He said that if unanswered, the article 
could be trouble.150  The Staten Island Advance for January 27, 1966, 
reported it this way: 
 
 145. See id.143 at 107. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See BAYH, supra note 58, at 119–24. 
 148. AM. BAR ASS’N, PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY:  WITH 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1965) (on file with the Fordham University School of Law 
Maloney Library). 
 149. See generally George D. Haimbaugh Jr., Vice Presidential Succession:  A Criticism of 
the Bayh-Cellar [sic] Plan, 17 S.C. L. REV. 315 (1965).  
 150. See Letter from Richard G. Lawrence, Articles Editor, S.C. Law Review, to author 
(Jan. 4, 1966) (on file with author) (“We have received your article in answer to Professor 
Haimbaugh’s article on the Bayh-Celler proposal.”); Letter from Steve Lesher, Press Sec’y, 
Office of Senator Birch Bayh, to author (Jan. 4, 1966) (on file with author) (thanking Feerick 
for his response to Haimbaugh’s article). 
2017] A PERSONAL REMEMBRANCE 1105 
Feerick and his colleagues recently rushed to put out a small fire started 
by a South Carolina lawyer.  The South Carolinian had argued in a state 
law review publication against passage of the measure, opposing 
specifically the provisions dealing with succession of the vice president.  
Copies of the article later showed up in the mailboxes of members of the 
Arkansas Legislature.151 
Fortunately, I was given an opportunity by the South Carolina Law Review 
to offer a rebuttal.  It appeared in that journal as an article entitled Vice 
Presidential Succession:  In Support of the Bayh-Celler Plan,152 to which 
Haimbaugh gave a short response.  ABA members in Arkansas were also 
doing their part to answer the charges contained in Haimbaugh’s article.  
They were effective in removing a block on the amendment in the state 
legislature and securing a favorable vote on its ratification.  We did not do as 
well in South Carolina, as noted. 
Another memorable moment involves a communication of February 2, 
1966, that I received from the incredibly energetic Dale Tooley, in which he 
noted that the ratification vote in Colorado 
will be extremely close, and we are bending every effort to contact those 
who have indicated a willingness to reconsider their opposition to the 
amendment.  As well as all of the others who voted “no” on second reading.  
You will probably see the results of the vote in the press . . . .153 
On the following day, February 3, I was surprised to read, undoubtedly the 
handiwork of Tooley, a story in the Rocky Mountain News reporting on 
reprints of an article of mine being widely distributed in the state.154  The 
article provided an analysis of every section of the amendment, concluding 
with this rallying cry, as quoted in the press story: 
Despite widespread recognition of the serious need for a method of 
determining presidential inability and, despite a long search for an 
acceptable method, none has ever been found which could command 
enough strength to be proposed by Congress . . . .  It is doubtful that a better 
proposal could be devised, considering the complexity of the problems 
involved and the great diversity of views.  The proposed twenty-fifth 
amendment has been made possible because of the willingness of 
Democrats and Republicans alike to compromise in the best interests of the 
Nation.  It remains for the state legislatures to ratify it and to make it a 
permanent part of the Constitution.  The nature of the subject dictates that 
this be done with all due speed.155 
 
 151. Don Bacon, 25th Amendment on Way to OK, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Jan. 27, 1966, 
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 153. Letter from Dale Tooley to John D. Feerick (Feb. 2, 1966) (on file with author). 
 154. Robert L. Chase, Careful Analysis of 25th, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 3, 1966, at 
43. 
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These words, the reader will note, reflect the strong influence of Benjamin 
Franklin’s clarion call of September 17, 1787.156  On February 3, 1966, 
Colorado became the eighteenth state to ratify the amendment. 
As for New York, although my letter to the Speaker of the State Assembly 
elicited his statement that the amendment would be approved shortly by his 
body, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee wrote that the Committee 
had more pressing items on its agenda.157  There may also have been some 
confusion over whether a ratification vote required a public referendum.  I 
passed along this letter to Brownell, who immediately wrote a letter to the 
chair with a different result:  the Committee would take up the subject shortly, 
and it did—the amendment was ratified in New York on March 14, 1966.158  
Prior to its approval, I had lobbied the leadership of the New York City Bar 
Association to adopt a resolution favoring the amendment, reflecting the 
position it had taken based on the work of its Federal Legislation 
Committee.159  It adopted such a resolution and sent it on to the legislature 
and Governor Rockefeller.160 
On November 15, 1966, Herbert Brownell and I received, at a meeting of 
the New York City Bar Association, a special award from ABA President 
Orison Marden for our work in the development of the amendment.  It was 
presented to us in the main meeting room of the Association’s building on 
West 44th Street, a floor below where Emalie had done her research in 
connection with the writing of From Failing Hands.  And, in this time period, 
Emalie and I were writing a book on the Vice Presidents for high school 
students, accepting an invitation from Franklin Watts, Inc., of the Grolier 
Publishing Company, as part of its first book series.161 
THE WHITE HOUSE, FEBRUARY 23, 1967 
When the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified, it became part of the 
Constitution.  Although the President of the United States has no role in 
approving an amendment, President Lyndon B. Johnson, nonetheless, wished 
to have a White House ceremony to announce its adoption and to issue an 
accompanying proclamation.  I was invited to this historic event, scheduled 
for February 23, 1967.162  On the designated day, I arrived at LaGuardia 
airport early for an Eastern Airlines shuttle to Washington, D.C.  But upon 
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my arrival, I learned that, because of the snow falling, no flights would be 
leaving.  I was comforted, however, when I saw Orison Marden, believing 
that his presence meant a plane would be leaving after all.  This did not 
happen, and after greeting me, he turned around and said he was going back 
to his New York City law office.  I waited and waited, and then, to my utmost 
surprise, I heard the announcer say that a flight to Washington would be 
taking off shortly.  I got on that flight, and when I arrived in Washington, the 
White House ceremony had already begun.  I hailed a cab immediately and 
raced to the White House. 
Arriving at the gate with the invitation in one hand and a small attaché in 
the other, I was waved through by the guards, and within seconds I was at the 
door of the White House.  Upon opening it, I saw the President emerge from 
the East Room, where he had given remarks marking the ratification, which 
I later read in his official papers.163 
He rushed to the Blue Room followed by many people, including 
Congressman Poff, who signaled to me to join him near the front of the line 
to greet the President.  Before I could do so, security pulled me aside, took 
my attaché case, and asked what I was doing there.  I explained and was then 
allowed, without the attaché case, to join Poff on the line.  The picture I 
subsequently received, signed by the President, showed me shaking his hand 
with my eyes closed and in a suit badly in need of pressing.  Its baggy nature 
was due to the inclement weather, while my facial expression reflected the 
exhilaration of meeting the President.  Nonetheless, the picture was good 
enough for me, and today it adorns a wall in my office.  Poff subsequently 
wrote me a letter and said the picture should have read at the bottom, “From 
Failing Hands.” 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMENDMENT 
Six years later, I was shocked to see the Amendment implemented, in 
circumstances I never expected:  the resignation of an elected Vice President, 
followed by his replacement under Section 2 of the Amendment; then the 
resignation nine months later of the President of the United States and the 
succession to the presidency of the replacing Vice President pursuant to 
Section 1, following which another Vice President was chosen under Section 
2, nominated by President Ford.164  The presence in the highest offices of 
two appointed officials, while unprecedented, gave the country enormous 
stability and continued party continuity in the White House.165  In connection 
with the application of the Amendment, I was asked by Senator Bayh to 
prepare a memorandum for the Judiciary Committee on the legislative history 
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 165. See id. at 932–33. 
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of Section 2166 and then later to testify before the Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments on the first applications of the Amendment.  I 
did so along with Professor Paul Freund and George Reedy, who was then 
dean of the journalism department of Marquette University.  We all supported 
the first implementations of the Amendment.  Reedy said: 
When I was preparing for this hearing, I consulted a number of my friends 
and people who have studied the matter, and the general conclusion that I 
came to is that the workings of the amendment are so well accepted, and 
the legitimacy of the present President is so well recognized, that it does 
not occur to anyone, except to people who do not like the present President, 
to challenge the workings of the amendment.167 
Professor Freund testified “that no persuasive case has been made for 
repealing or altering section 2 of the amendment.”168  My testimony 
explained the legislative history of the Amendment.169  It concurred with 
other witnesses who said that a succeeding Vice President appointed under 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, as well as a statutory successor such as the 
Speaker, could nominate a successor Vice President.  Freund agreed with that 
conclusion, as did James Kirby in his separate testimony.170  I also advanced 
in my testimony, on behalf of the ABA, a recommendation that in future 
invocations of Section 2, joint rather than separate hearings of the two Houses 
of Congress should occur, even though the Houses would vote separately on 
the issue of confirmation, in order to facilitate the selection of a new Vice 
President and reduce the risks associated with a vacancy in that office.171  
Unlike another occasion when I testified in support of the ABA’s Electoral 
College position, Senator Thurmond had only one question of me: 
Mr. Feerick, from your statement, I construe that the American Bar 
Association had an active part in the formulation of the 25th amendment; 
and it is the position of the American Bar Association, and your personal 
position too, that it has worked, and that there is no need to change.  Is that 
correct?”172 
I replied, “Yes, sir.”173 
CHANGING THE AMENDMENT 
In the 1990s, I found myself immersed in the question of the Amendment’s 
adequacy.  This came about as a result of a recommendation in 1994 by 
President Jimmy Carter that the American Academy of Neurology organize 
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a forum on presidential disability.  This resulted in the convening of a 
working group, Disability in U.S. Presidents.174  I declined to participate in 
its early going, believing I was too fixed in my points of view about the 
adequacy of the Amendment.  As explained to me when I was invited to 
participate, there was a general view by the organizers of the group that the 
Amendment was not adequate—almost suggesting, as I remember the 
conversation, that its approach should be changed.  From a conflict of interest 
perspective, I felt it best that I not participate as I was too fixed in my views.  
When asked by the ABA to be its representative on the group, I instead 
recommended that Professor Joel Goldstein be its representative, which he 
became. 
This working group subsequently organized major sessions at the Carter 
Center in January 1995, Wake Forest University in November 1995, and the 
White House Convention Center in Washington, D.C., in December 1996.  In 
the following year, a very impressive volume was published by the working 
group, entitled Presidential Disability:  Papers, Discussions, and 
Recommendations on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Issues of Inability 
and Disability in Presidents of the United States, edited by James F. Toole 
and Robert J. Joynt.175  I was encouraged to participate in both the Wake 
Forest Conference’s plenary session and at the Convention Center meeting 
where the final recommendations of the group were actively considered.  The 
Wake Forest Conference is memorable because I participated along with 
Senator Bayh and two distinguished members of the medical community who 
shared a different point of view of the Amendment from the one held by Bayh 
and me.  President Gerald Ford opened the session and, in a friendly aside 
beforehand with Senator Bayh, asked him what to say (even though the 
President already had his prepared remarks), to which Bayh pointed to my 
article to be published in the Wake Forest Law Review in support of the 
Amendment.176 
At the White House Convention Center, I felt uncomfortable because I 
ended up opposing some aspects of the recommendations on the table for 
discussion.  One called for a separate determination by doctors of 
“presidential impairment” before a political judgment of “presidential 
inability,” which caused me to join in a minority opinion as to the desirability 
of such a recommendation.  I was joined in that opinion by both Professor 
Goldstein and Senator Bayh.  We concluded with the statement that 
“decisions regarding the exercise of executive power under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment . . . should be made by accountable constitutional officials, not 
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by doctors, attorneys, or others who have not been elected by the people or 
confirmed by their representatives.”177 
From time to time since this review of the Amendment, I have returned to 
this subject by helping to develop a program at Fordham on the adequacy of 
our presidential succession system and a presidential succession clinic at 
Fordham University School of Law and by writing articles with my current 
perspectives.178  In 2017, the Amendment took on a special examination by 
the media, in a heightened political context, in which I sought to educate 
others.179  As I wrote in a personal document in February 1967, the meaning 
this field has given my life cannot be captured in words. 
 
 
 177. John D. Feerick, Joel K. Goldstein & Birch Bayh, Minority Opinion Regarding 
Recommendation IV, in DISABILITY IN U.S. PRESIDENTS:  REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
COMMENTARIES BY THE WORKING GROUP, supra note 174, at 20, 20. 
 178. See generally John D. Feerick, A Response to Akhil Reed Amar’s Address on 
Applications and Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 41 (2010); 
John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability:  Filling in the Gaps, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 11 
(2014); Feerick, supra note 164 
 179. See Jerry H. Goldfeder & Myrna Pérez, President Trump and the 25th Amendment, 
N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202784725189/ 
[https://perma.cc/J6B2-ZSSQ]; see also Rebecca Harrington, A Loophole in the 25th 
Amendment Lets 14 People Remove a Sitting President from Office, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 
2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/25th-amendment-how-can-you-remove-president-
from-office-2017-3 [https://perma.cc/4J6T-R5WA]; Evan Osnos, How Trump Could Get 
Fired, NEW YORKER (May 8, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/how-
trump-could-get-fired [https://perma.cc/MC4N-328F]. 
